By advances in cloud storage systems, users have access to the data saved in the cloud and can manipulate the data without limitation of time and place. As the data owner no longer possesses data physically, he is required to ensure the integrity of the data stored in the cloud with the public key given by public key infrastructure (PKI). Thus the security of PKI and certi¯cates are essential. However, there are numerous security risks in the traditional PKI and it is complex to administer the certi¯cates. Certi¯cateless public key cryptography is used in this paper to solve these problems. We also use elliptic curve group to reduce computation overhead. In this paper, we design a certi¯cateless public veri¯cation mechanism to check the integrity of data outsourced in the cloud and we further extend it to support a multiuser group by batch verication. Speci¯cally, a public veri¯er who replaces the data owner to check the integrity in the proposed scheme does not require to manage any certi¯cates during the veri¯cation process. Meanwhile, a veri¯er is not required to download the entire¯le for integrity checking. Theoretical analyses verify the security of our scheme and experimental results show its e±ciency.
Introduction
With the rapid development of cloud computing, as a part of cloud computing, cloud storage 1 which manages and organizes data, allows data users to outsource and have access to their¯les anytime, with any device and from anywhere. Thus users prefer to store data in the cloud rather than store them locally. On the one hand, cloud storage greatly reduces users' pressure on storage and calculation, 2 and every group member is able to access the shared data. 3 On the other hand, it o®ers scalable payment which costs less than storing the data locally. 4 However, the cloud server is not reliable 5 enough to neglect some security problems in cloud storage. First, the data stored in the cloud may be spoiled because of hardware failures or human errors. Second, the data security was threatened by attacks inside and outside. What is worse, to avoid the loss of reputation or pro¯ts, cloud server may even conceal accidents of data errors. Therefore, it is an urgent security demand to verify the integrity of shared data stored in the cloud. Digital signatures and hash functions are utilized to handle the problem of cloud data integrity checking. In 2007, Ateniese et al.
6¯r st proposed provable data possession (PDP) and formalized the security model for this primitive. To enable cloud users to check the integrity of their outsourced data without knowing the entire¯le e±ciently, they presented two highly e®ective and provably secure PDP schemes. 6, 7 At the same time, Juels and Kaliski 8 proposed the concept of proof of retrievability (PoR) which enables the cloud server to generate a correct proof that the cloud user can retrieve the remote¯le. In PoR, they used pseudorandom sampling technique to present a sentinel-based construction. However, the number of sentinels limits the times of veri¯cation. All the approaches [6] [7] [8] need a user with the private key to realize integrity veri¯cation. 9, 10 To release users' pressure on data integrity veri¯cation, a third-party auditor (TPA) is introduced to verify the integrity of¯les stored in the cloud instead of users. However, during the veri¯cation, the veri¯er may get some con¯dential message from the proof message received from the cloud. Therefore, privacy protection [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] should be taken into account in public auditing protocol. Wang et al. 11 constructed homomorphic authenticator scheme based on ring signature to protect the identity of le signer. By integrating public key-based homomorphic linear authenticator with random masking, Wang et al. 14 proposed a protocol which guarantees that the TPA could not learn any knowledge about the data content stored in the cloud server during the e±cient auditing process. Yu et al. 16 also applied \zero-knowledge privacy" to ensure that the veri¯er cannot obtain any information from public available data. Besides data con¯dentiality, Hwang et al.'s scheme 17 also supports data dynamic operations and batch auditing, but the security proof is heuristic and they did not show experimental results in the paper. As these schemes [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 17 are all based on public key infrastructure (PKI), they all have some drawbacks such as expensive computation cost and complex certi¯cate management.
To address the key management issues, some protocols 18-21 based on identity cryptography have been put forward. For example, Zhang and Dong 21 proposed an e±cient identity-based auditing protocol for cloud data integrity and extended their protocol to assist multiuser setting. However, as Identity-based signature 22 has key escrow problem and certi¯cate management problem, it is better to use certi¯cateless signature (CLS) to construct public auditing scheme. Wang et al. 23 proposed the CPA scheme which is the¯rst certi¯cateless 24 public auditing mechanism for verifying data integrity in the cloud. Then, CLPA was proposed by He et al. 25 to support wireless body area networks. But these two schemes 23, 25 cannot support multiuser groups.
In this paper, we¯rst design a certi¯cateless signature scheme based on the technology of elliptic curve and bilinear maps. Then, we further build an entire certi¯cateless public veri¯cation mechanism for verifying the integrity of outsourced data in an unreliable cloud. Furthermore, we extend our scheme to support multiuser in cloud storage to make the public auditing more e±cient. Public veri¯ers in our certi¯cateless public veri¯cation scheme do not need to manage certi¯cates, which eliminates the security risks in schemes using PKI. In addition, our protocol guarantees a veri¯er to check the correctness of the outsourced data e±ciently without learning any knowledge about the data content stored in the cloud server during the e±cient auditing process. Speci¯cally, our contribution can be summarized as follows.
(i) We¯rst present a certi¯cateless signature which uses the knowledge of the elliptic curve and bilinear maps. We then propose a public veri¯cation scheme which can be used to check the cloud data integrity based on the signature. (ii) Our scheme supports scalable and e±cient public veri¯cation for data stored in the cloud. Speci¯cally, it constructs a batch auditing approach which can be carried out by the veri¯er to breeze through auditing tasks from di®erent users simultaneously. The experimental results show that the auditing overhead is independent of the group user numbers. (iii) We prove that the proposed scheme is provably secure under the discrete logarithm assumption (DLA) and the experimental results show that our scheme is more e±cient as compared to representative methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 introduces the cryptographic primitives. Then, we provide the detailed description of our model system and a certi¯cateless signature in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we describe a certi¯cateless public veri¯cation mechanism for verifying outsourced data in an unreliable cloud based on the certi¯cateless signature. We design a public auditing scheme which satis¯es a multiuser group in Sec. 5, followed by Sec. 6 where the security and performance of our work are evaluated. Finally, Sec. 7 gives the concluding remark of this paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we describe three kinds of technology to make the readers feel easier to understand our scheme.
Bilinear map
Let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q. Let g be a generator of G 1 . A bilinear map is a map e : G 1 Â G 1 ! G 2 . This bilinearity implies that for any u 1 ; u 2 ; v 2 G 1 , we have eðu 1 Á u 2 ; vÞ ¼ eðu 1 ; vÞ Á eðu 2 ; vÞ. Of course, there is an e±ciently computable algorithm for computing e and the map should be nontrivial, i.e., e is nondegenerate: eðg; gÞ 6 ¼ 1.
Elliptic curve group
Let E=F denote an elliptic curve E over a prime¯nite¯eld F , the points in it satis¯ed the following equation:
An extra point O called the point at in¯nity together with the points on E=F form a group G ¼ fðx; yÞ : x; y 2 F ; Eðx; yÞ ¼ 0g [ fOg.
In polynomial time, we assume two problems viz. discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and DLA, which are de¯ned in group G to be intractable:
. DLP: The discrete logarithm problem states that it is hard to compute x for a party who knows the generator P of G and Q ¼ x Á P .
. DLA: The discrete logarithm assumption states that for any polynomial-time algorithm, the probability of solving the DLP is negligible.
Certi¯cateless signatures
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson 24 proposed certi¯cateless signatures to release entities from managing certi¯cates in public key cryptography. Key escrow problem which exists in identity-based Signatures, is not in CLSs. A CLS scheme consists of ve algorithms as follows:
(1) Setup: With a security parameter, this algorithm sets up a master key and the system parameters. (2) Partial-private-extract: A user gets a part of his secret key and registers his identity to key generation center (KGC) to get the remaining part. In CLS scheme, the KGC only generates a partial private key of an entity and the entity generates the remaining part of his private key himself. Therefore, the KGC does not have the whole knowledge of an entity's private key and it does not have the ability to compute a valid signature. Al-Riyami and Paterson. 24 de¯ned that a secure CLS scheme is able to resist two kinds of adversaries, A1 as a malicious KGC and A2 as a dishonest user.
Adversary 1: Adversary A1 can access to the master key, but cannot replace any user's public key.
Adversary 2: Adversary A2 does not have access to the master key, but A2 can replace user's public key as our scheme is certi¯cateless.
Model and Signature Scheme
In this section, we¯rst introduce the system model, and then show the design of signature scheme.
System model
For a certi¯cateless public veri¯cation system in cloud data storage, the architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Our system model consists of four entities: a data user group, a public veri¯er, the cloud server and a KGC.
A data user group consists of a lot of users who have large amount of data¯les to save or share. A public veri¯er is a server with the ability of computation and he/she is able to check the integrity of data outsourced by a challenge-and-response protocol. The cloud server has signi¯cant storage space and computation resources. A KGC will generate a partial secret key of a user who has registered his/her identity before. In the veri¯cation, a data owner sends verify request to public veri¯er to examine the integrity of the outsourced data. Upon receiving this request, the veri¯er generates a challenge message and sends it to the cloud server. Then the cloud server replies the proof message to the veri¯er. Finally, the public veri¯er checks the correctness of the proof message and returns 0/1 to the data owner.
Signature scheme
Our signature scheme consists of¯ve parts: Setup, Partial-private-extract, KeyGen, Sign and Verify. The details of these algorithms are described as follows.
Setup. Given a security parameter k, this algorithm sets up a master key and system parameters. Upon getting k, KGC has four steps to do as follows. First, it selects an additive cyclic group G 1 and a multiplicative G 2 of the same prime order q > 2k. Second, it chooses e : G 1 Â G 1 ! G 2 as a bilinear map and P , T as two generators of group G 1 . There are two hash functions, which are used to map data of arbitrary size to data of¯xed size, H 1 : f0; 1g Ã ! G 1 and
Then, KGC randomly takes x 2 Z q as its master private key and computes its public key as P pub ¼ x Á P . Finally, it keeps master private key x secretly and publishes system parameters as Param = ðG 1 ; G 2 ; q; e; P ; T ; H 1 ; H 2 ; P pub Þ. Partial-private-extract. The user i with identity ID randomly picks x ID as part of his secret key and computes P ID ¼ x ID Á P . Then, he registers his identity to KGC and gets the rest of his secret key.
KeyGen. With a user's identi¯er ID, the master key x, user's public key P ID and system parameters, this algorithm returns the user's identity-based private key. In this step, KGC chooses a random r ID , computes R ID ¼ r ID Á P and h ID ¼ H 1 ðID; R ID ; P ID Þ. Then KGC computes s ID ¼ r ID þ h ID Á x and sends ðs ID ; R ID Þ to the user through a secure channel.
After getting ðs ID ; R ID Þ, the user needs to check the validity of s ID through verifying the equality s ID P ¼ R ID þ h ID Á P pub . The user will accept s ID if the equation holds. Because s ID ¼ r ID þ h ID Á x, R ID ¼ r ID Á P and x ID Á P ¼ P ID , we can¯nd that the equation holds. Finally, the private key of user with identity ID is the pair sk ID ¼ ðs ID ; x ID Þ and the public key is pk ID ¼ ðP ID ; R ID Þ.
Sign. The user with identity ID takes the system parameters Param = ðG 1 ; G 2 ; q; e; P ; T ; H 1 ; H 2 ; P pub Þ, his own private key sk ID ¼ ðs ID ; x ID Þ and a message m with abstract index as inputs, then generates a signature of the message. In this algorithm, the user computes h ¼ H 2 ðmjjindexjjIDÞ and computes its signature as
The user uploads the signature and the message to the cloud server.
Verify. After receiving the signature and message, the cloud server needs to verify the correctness of the signature. The veri¯er¯rst computes h ID ¼ H 1 ðID; R ID ; P ID Þ, and then veri¯es whether eðs; P Þ ¼ eðT ; m Á P ID Þ Á eðh; R ID Þ Á eðh Á h ID ; P pub Þ holds.
Signature correctness means that a valid signature is able to pass the veri¯cation. If the signature is indeed generated correctly, due to
we have Eq. (1). Therefore, we ensure that the signature is generated by the user with identity ID correctly if eðs; P Þ ¼ eðT ; m Á P ID ÞÁ eðh; R ID Þ Á eðh Á h ID ; P pub Þ:
Certi¯cateless Public Veri¯cation Scheme
In this section, we will propose an e±cient certi¯cateless public auditing scheme based on the signature scheme in Sec. 3. Our scheme consists of seven algorithms: Setup, Partial-private-extract, KeyGen, Sign, Challenge, ProofGen and ProofVerify. The¯rst three algorithms are same as those in Sec. 3, so we only show the details of the last four algorithms as follows.
Sign. Given a data¯le M with abstract index, this algorithm divides M into n blocks, M ¼ fm 1 ; . . . ; m n g. The data user with identity ID takes the system parameters Param = ðG 1 ; G 2 ; q; e; P ; T ; H 1 ; H 2 ; P pub Þ, his own private key sk ID ¼ ðs ID ; x ID Þ and a message m i as inputs, the generates a signature of the message. For 1 i n, the user computes h i ¼ H 2 ðm i jjindexjjIDÞ and computes the signature
The user uploads the signature S ¼ ðs 1 ; . . . ; s n Þ and the message M ¼ ðm 1 ; . . . ; m n Þ to the cloud server.
Challenge. It is necessary for a veri¯er to check the integrity of the data in the cloud because the data owner may no longer get his¯le back if he did not store the data locally. The veri¯er randomly chooses a c-element subset I of set ½1; n and a number ' to produce the challenge chall ¼ f'; Ig and send it to the cloud server.
ProofGen. After receiving the challenge chall ¼ f'; Ig, the cloud server computes a c-element set C ¼ ði; v i Þ where i 2 I; v i ¼ ' i mod q. Based on the¯le M ¼ ðm 1 ; . . . ; m n Þ, the cloud server computes the values
Á m i and sends proof message Pro ¼ fS; H; g to the veri¯er. ProofVerify. Upon getting the proof message Pro ¼ fS; H; g from cloud server, the veri¯er¯rst computes h ID ¼ H 1 ðID; R ID ; P ID Þ and then veri¯es the correctness of Pro by checking the equality eðS; P Þ ¼ eðT ; Á P ID Þ Á eðH; R ID ÞÁ eðH Á h ID ; P pub Þ. The veri¯er will accept the proof if the equality holds, otherwise reject it. According to the de¯nition of public auditing, 23 the correctness means that if the¯le has not been destroyed, the Pro is able to pass the veri¯cation, which is proved by checking whether the equation holds:
. Therefore, the correctness of the proposed public veri¯cation scheme has been proved.
Batch Veri¯cation Scheme in the Multiuser Group
Data integrity checking is a necessary service in cloud computing. In real cloud, there is usually more than a user in a data group. Therefore, we extend our scheme to support multiuser group and make the veri¯cation scheme more e±cient as we realize batch veri¯cation in this paper. Let U denote the set of users, the batch auditing scheme for multiuser is as follows. For each data user with identity ID m ; m 2 U, thē rst four algorithms are same as those in Sec. 4. Then we just show the details of the other three di®erent algorithms: Challenge, ProofGen and ProofVerify.
Challenge. The veri¯er randomly chooses a c m -element subset I m of set ½1; n for every user in U and a number ' to produce the challenge chall ¼ f'; I m g m2U and send it to the cloud server.
ProofGen. After receiving the challenge chall ¼ f'; I m g m2U , the cloud server computes the set 
and sends the proof message Pro ¼ fS 0 ; H 0 ; 0 g to the veri¯er.
ProofVerify. Upon getting the proof message Pro ¼ fS 0 ; H 0 ; 0 g from cloud server, the veri¯er¯rst computes h ID m ¼ H 1 ðID m ; R ID m ; P ID m Þ and then checks whether does the equation eðS 0 ; P Þ ¼ eðT ; 0 P m2jUj P ID m Þ Á eðH 0 ; P m2jUj R ID m Þ Á eðH Á P m2jUj h ID m ; P pub Þ hold to verify the correctness. The veri¯er will accept the proof if the elements make the equality hold, otherwise reject it.
Security and Performance Analysis
To measure the e±ciency of our scheme, we analyze the security and performance in this section.
Security analysis
Theorem 1. In the proposed scheme, no adversary A can forge a valid signature on a new message even if he/she has got some message-signature pairs in our scheme.
Proof. As de¯ned in scheme, 24 a secure CLS scheme can assist two kinds of adversaries:
. Adversary 1 as a malicious KGC: Adversary A1 can access to the master key, but cannot replace any user's public key.
. Adversary 2 as a dishonest user: Adversary A2 does not have access to the master key, but A2 can replace user's public key as our scheme is certi¯cateless.
We will prove that if A1 or A2 is able to forge a valid signature, then there exists an algorithm F that can solve the DLP. Let us consider about the issues of A1 and A2. A1: Suppose that there is a type-1 adversary A1 for an adaptively chosen message attack against our scheme, i.e., A1 is a ðt; q c ; q s ; q h Þ-forger. Then, A1 is able to construct an algorithm F solving the DLP. F randomly picks a value x 2 Z q as the system master key, sets P pub ¼ x Á P , selects an identity ID Ã at random as the challenged ID and gives the public parameters Param = ðG 1 ; G 2 ; q; e; P ; T ; H 1 ; H 2 ; P pub Þ and the system master key x to A1. Then F answers A1's queries as follows.
Create(ID): A1 queries F to respond ðID; R ID ; P ID ; s ID ; x ID ; h ID Þ with identity ID i . If ID i is in the hash list L C which F maintains, F sends it to A1. Otherwise, 
The simulation of the \Create" oracle fails if the random oracle assignment H 1 ðID; R ID ; P ID Þ causes inconsistency. It happens with a probability equals to q h =n. Hence, the simulation is successful q c times with a probability ð1 À q h =nÞ q c which is larger than 1 À q h q c n . The simulation of the H 2 oracle fails if the random oracle assignment H 2 ðmjjindexjjIDÞ causes inconsistency. It happens with a probability equals to q h =n. Hence, the simulation is successful q h times with a probability ð1 À q h =nÞ q h which is larger than 1 À q 2 h n . In addition, the probability of ID ¼ ID Ã is 1=q c . Thus, the overall successful probability is at most n Þ. A2: Suppose that there is a type-2 adversary A2 for an adaptively chosen message attack against our scheme, i.e., A2 is a ðt; q c ; q s ; q h Þ-forger. Then, A2 is able to construct an algorithm F solving the DLP. F randomly picks a value x 2 Z q as the system master key, sets P pub ¼ x Á P , selects an identity ID Ã at random as the challenged ID and gives the public parameters Param ¼ ðG 1 ; G 2 ; q; e; P ; T ; H 1 ; H 2 ; P pub Þ and the system master key x to A2. Then F answers A2's queries as follows.
Create(ID): A2 queries F to respond ðID; R ID ; P ID ; s ID ; x ID ; h ID Þ with the identity
Finally, F responds with ðID; R ID ; P ID ; s ID ; x ID ; h ID Þ and inserts ðID; R ID ; P ID ; h ID Þ into L H 1 . In this step, ðR ID ; s ID ; h ID Þ satis¯ed the equation s ID Á P ¼ R ID þ h ID Á P pub . In other words, the secret key is valid.
H 1 -query: When A2 queries H 1 to get h ID with identity ID, F responds with the previously de¯ned value if the ID is already in L H 1 . Otherwise, F queries Create(ID) to get ðID; R ID ; P ID ; s ID ; x ID ; h ID Þ and returns h ID .
Partial-Private-Extract(ID): If ID ¼ ID Ã , F terminates. Otherwise, F queries Create(ID) to get ðID; R ID ; P ID ; s ID ; x ID ; h ID Þ and returns s ID .
Key-Gen(ID): F responds with the previously de¯ned value pk ID ¼ ðP ID ; R ID Þ if the ID is already in L C . Otherwise, F queries Create(ID) to get ðID; R ID ; P ID ; s ID ; x ID ; h ID Þ and returns pk ID . If ID ¼ ID Ã , F terminates. Otherwise, F responds with x ID .
Public-Key-Replacement(ID, pk ID 0 ): Hash list L R stores all tuples with the content of ðID; r ID ; R ID ; x ID ; P ID Þ and is initialized to be empty. When A2 queries ðID; pk ID 0 Þ, F sets R ID ¼ R ID 0 ; P ID ¼ P ID 0 ; s ID ¼? and x ID ¼ x ID 0 and adds ðID; r ID 0 ;
H 2 -query: When A2 queries H 2 to get h ID with identity ID, F picks up h 2 Z q and sets h ¼ H 2 ðmjjindexjjIDÞ, adds ðm; ID; R ID ; P ID ; hÞ and returns h.
Sign(ID, m): When A2 queries on ðID; mÞ, if ID 6 ¼ ID Ã , F acts as the description of our scheme. Otherwise,
The simulation of the Create oracle fails if the random oracle assignment H 1 ðID; R ID ; P ID Þ causes inconsistency. It happens with a probability equals to q h =n. Hence, the simulation is successful q c times with a probability ð1 À q h =nÞ q c which is larger than 1 À q h q c n . The simulation of the H 2 oracle fails if the random oracle assignment H 2 ðmjjindexjjIDÞ causes inconsistency. It happens with a probability equals to q h =n. Hence, the simulation is successful q h times with a probability ð1 À q h =nÞ q n which is larger than 1 À n . In addition, the probability of ID ¼ ID Ã is 1=q c . Thus, the overall successful probability is less than
As discussed above, if A1 or A2 is able to successfully generate a forgery of a signature, then F is able to solve the DL problem, which contradicts to the DLA. Therefore, it is hard to generate a forgery of a signature.
Theorem 2.
No replace attack; which means the cloud server is able to pass the checking with other message rather than the challenged message; exists in our auditing protocol.
Proof. The cloud server can pass the veri¯cation when and only when all the challenged data blocks and their signatures are correct. If any one of them is corrupted or not up-to-date on the server, the server cannot pass the checking since the equation does not hold. If the cloud executes a replace attack to pass the veri¯cation, he needs to use a wrong set such as fs l ; h l ; m l g to replace fs j ; h j ; m j g. And he generates the proof message as
P pub Þ which can be proven as shown in Eq. (3) .
When and only when h l À h j ¼ 0, the cloud server is able to pass the veri¯cation. The fact is that due to the collision resistance of hash functions, h l À h j cannot be equal to zero. In other words, the cloud server cannot pass the auditing in our scheme. Hence, our scheme can resist the replace attack:
Theorem 3. The public veri¯er cannot get any information about the outsourced data from the values he received during the veri¯cation.
Proof. In the verify procedure, a public veri¯er can obtain chall ¼ f'; Ig and Pro ¼ ðS; H; Þ. Then, the veri¯er is able to get the information from Pro. It is clear that the information of data owner cannot be recovered from Pro as these values are with the following form:
Although the veri¯er can compute all i 2 I; v i ¼ ' i mod q, he cannot obtain all s i ; h i ; m i from the equations above. However, they are linear with unknown jIj variables, respectively, where jIj may be 460. It means that they have q jIj solutions to test the equation
and only one of them is the real value the veri¯er wants to get. In other words, the probability of obtaining right s i ; h i ; m i is q ÀjIj . Furthermore, it is impossible for the veri¯er to extract m i from h i since hash function is a one-way function. Therefore, the veri¯er does not have the ability to obtain any information about the data block during the veri¯cation process.
Performance analysis
We¯rst evaluate the performance of our scheme by calculating the communication and calculation overheads. Then we compare the computation overhead of our scheme with schemes CPA 23 and CLPA. 25 The notations of operations throughout this paper are listed in Table 1 .
Computation cost
In ProofGen, a public veri¯er sends audit challenge chall ¼ f'; Ig to the cloud. Then the cloud generates the audit proof message Pro ¼ ðS; H; Þ and returns it to the veri¯er. The computation overhead of generating audit proof is cExp G 1 þ 3cMul G 1 and that of verifying a proof is 4Pair þ 4Mul G 1 þ Hash G 1 . We compare them with the schemes CPA 23 and CLPA 25 in Table 2 . When we audit several¯les together, batch auditing is more e±cient than normal auditing. To show the di®erence between normal auditing and batch auditing, we list the computation overheads of them in Table 3 . Note that we use m to denote the number of auditing¯les. Table 1 . Notations of cryptographic operations.
Symbol
Meanings
Hash operation in G 1 Pair Pair operation jAj Length of A Table 2 . Comparison of public auditing computation costs.
Note: The meanings of notations are in Table 1 . Table 3 . Comparison of normal auditing and batch auditing.
Computation overhead
Normal auditing
To check the integrity of data in the cloud, a public veri¯er sends an auditing challenge chall ¼ f'; Ig to the cloud¯rst, and then the cloud needs to send an auditing response Por ¼ ðS; H; Þ back to the public veri¯er. In ProofGen and ProofVerify, similar to CPA 23 and CLPA, 25 the communication cost of an auditing challenge is jqj þ cjnj bits, and the communication cost of an auditing response is 3jqj bits, where n is the total number of blocks, jqj is the length of an element of Z q , and jpj is the length of an element of Z p .
Experimental results
In the following experiments, we utilize the pairing-based cryptography (PBC) 26 library to simulate the cryptographic operations in our scheme, and all the experiments are tested on Ubuntu system with Intel Core i7 3.40 GHz processor over 1,000 times. We assume jqj ¼ 160 bits, jpj ¼ 160 bits and the number of blocks in shared data is n ¼ 1; 000; 000 and jnj ¼ 20 bits. Every block has k elements where k ¼ 1 as we did not split m i as in CPA. 23 According to previous work, 4 to keep the detection probability greater than 99%, we set the number of selected blocks in an auditing task as c ¼ 460. Table 4 and Fig. 2 show the comparison of experimental results between our scheme and the schemes CPA 23 and CLPA. 25 It is obvious that our scheme is more e±cient. The communication cost of our scheme is the same as that of schemes CPA 23 and CLPA. 25 The lower the communication cost, the better it is for mobile storage.
To show the e±ciency of batch auditing, we show the di®erence between normal auditing and batch auditing in Fig. 3 . Batch auditing means that several¯les can be veri¯ed together and it needs less auditing time than normal auditing which has to audit these¯les one by one. As shown in Table 3 , we audit c blocks of a¯le and the number of¯les is m. In Fig. 3 , we set c as 460 to keep the detection probability greater than 99%. It is easy to¯nd that the overhead of normal auditing is same as in batch auditing when m is equal to 1. As batch auditing aggregates some elements, it costs less than normal auditing which needs more \Pair" and \Hash" operations. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an e±cient certi¯cateless signature with the knowledge of elliptic curve and bilinear map. Then we design a certi¯cateless public veri¯cation mechanism based on the signature to check the integrity of data outsourced in cloud. Speci¯cally, the scheme allows a public veri¯er who does not need to manage certi¯cates during the veri¯cation other than the data owner to check for data integrity. Meanwhile, a veri¯er checks the integrity without retrieving the entire data. To consider the real cloud storage environment, we further extend it to support batch veri¯cation which is more e±cient in multiuser groups than in other public auditing schemes. We prove that our scheme is provably secure under the discrete logarithm assumption and the experimental results shows that our scheme is more e±cient.
